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ABSTRACT
This contribution investigates what motivates the use of European Union (EU)
law at the street level of migration law implementation. The street level is a
crucial venue for EU implementation because lower-level implementers
critically influence the level of EU compliance eventually achieved. Employing
a bottom–up approach towards implementation, the article combines insights
from social psychology and the street-level literature to develop expectations
about the relation between individuals’ motivations and their use of EU law.
The study investigates through qualitative interviews to what extent German
migration administrators use EU law in three multilevel decision contexts. The
main findings are that uses of EU law vary across contexts and individual
implementers. Particularly when national regulatory frameworks are
ambiguous, substantive moral norms and instrumental motivations trigger
some implementers to rely on EU law. This reliance even has the potential to
correct for problematic transposition.
KEYWORDS EU implementation; implementation motivations; migration law; street-level bureaucracy
Introduction
European Union (EU) law increasingly spreads into policy areas which used to
be at the core of national law. A topical example is EU migration law which
gradually shapes domestic legislation (Boswell and Geddes 2011; Zaun 2016).
However, the Union lacks an implementation apparatus and relies on national
administrations to apply its laws (Treib 2014: 6). This indirect implementation
system leads to the question of whether individual national administrations
turn into ‘double-hatted’ agents, serving a national and a European master
(Egeberg and Trondal 2009), and to what extent they become ‘guardians of
EU law’ (Mastenbroek 2017).
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These questions have been analysed mainly for higher-level officials at the
ministry level (e.g., Bach et al. 2015). Respectively, in EU implementation
studies the practices of lower-level implementers remain largely unexplored
(but see Gulbrandsen 2011). However, since Lipsky’s (1980) seminal work, it
is widely acknowledged that street-level implementers at the ‘frontline’,
between the laws in the books and actual practice crucially influence the
final outcome of policies.
EU law places street-level implementers at a second frontline, namely
between domestic and EU regulatory frameworks. The second frontline can
lead to new legal ambiguities because much EU law introduces fuzzy legal
concepts (Treib 2014: 6), and national legislators frequently fail to transpose
EU law in time, or do so in non-compliant ways (Angelova et al. 2012; Treib
2014). This can make EU law directly effective and raises the question: to
what extent do street-level implementers use EU law to solve legal ambiguity
and what motivates them when doing so?
By investigating this question, this study takes up the call by Woll and
Jacquot (2010: 113) to explore variation in individuals’ motivations for using
EU law. So far, most compliance studies have adopted top–down perspectives
that focus on the member state level to explain variation in EU implemen-
tation (Thomann and Sager 2017a). These studies have relied on rationalist
or constructivist approaches (Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005; Mastenbroek and
Kaeding 2006) assuming institutional logics of consequentiality or appropri-
ateness (March and Olsen 1998).
Similarly, behavioural perspectives on frontline implementation (Maynard-
Moody and Musheno 2012; Tummers et al. 2016) and social psychology
studies (Tyler 2006) distinguish between instrumental and normative motiv-
ations to explain behaviour. Whereas actors driven by instrumental motiv-
ations evaluate risks connected to different applications of the law, actors
driven by normative motivations take guidance from procedural or substan-
tive norms. These conceptualizations overlap with institutional logics of con-
sequentiality and appropriateness. While institutional actor logics are
concerned with organizations and individuals, the social psychology literature
has been proven to be particularly useful to investigate individual level motiv-
ations. Therefore, the latter perspective is used in this study.
Applied to the EU context, it is expected that instrumental motivations dis-
courage use of EU law, but normative motivations can generate uses of EU
law. By adding the behavioural perspective to EU implementation, this
study contributes to clarify the role of and relationship between the insti-
tutional actor logics at the micro level of EU implementation. Additionally,
the study adds to the emerging bottom–up approaches in EU implementation
studies that go beyond legal compliance (Thomann 2015; Thomann and Zhe-
lyazkova 2017; Thomann and Sager 2017a).
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Furthermore, this study tackles the policy sector bias of many EU implemen-
tation studies (Treib 2014: 17; Gollata and Newig 2017) by exploring the use of
EU law and implementation motivations in the topical context of EUmigration
law. EU migration law received most explicit attention in studies that focused
on the Europeanization of the multilevel legal context (Boswell and Geddes
2011; Zaun 2016). The insights of these studies and the more general street-
level migration literature, suggest that the field constitutes a crucial case for
bottom–up investigations of motivations. First, migration law requires con-
siderable street-level implementation (Ellermann 2006; Eule 2014). Second,
the gradual addition of EU law adds a new liberal legal level to domestic regu-
lations (Bonjour and Vink 2013). Member states are reluctant to adjust their
regulatory frameworks to new EU pressure, leading to new ambiguity at the
street level. Thus, when street-level implementers decide on residence
permits, they not only affect the life chances of individual migrants, but they
also determine to what extent EU migration laws become practice. Third, the
normatively laden field of migration provides good conditions to observe vari-
ation inmotivations becausemigration law implementers are often confronted
with conflicting positions between their role as loyal implementers and their
personal normative considerations (Düvell and Jordan 2003).
The study investigates decision-making of case workers of the foreign
registration offices (Ausländerbehörden) of the German Bundesland of North
Rhine-Westphalia. These case workers decide on residence permits while
operating at a local level in decentralized administrative structure with
much face-to-face interaction with their clients (Ellermann 2006; Eule 2014).
Such working contexts are prone for variation in motivations.
Drawing on qualitative interviews with 21 implementers in ten Ausländer-
behörden, the analysis reveals that street-level implementers use EU law to
varying degrees. Generally, implementers do not use EU law by extending
their discretion in nationally tightly regulated contexts, or by explicitly contra-
dict national regulatory frameworks. However, when national regulations
remain unclear, many implementers use EU law next to national law. In line
with the expectations, implementers with pronounced substantive normative
motivations use the legal levels creatively. In contrast to the expectations, also
instrumental motivations trigger sometimes reliance on EU law. Procedural
norms are limited in triggering uses of EU law.
Theorizing motivations for street-level use of EU law
During street-level implementation use of EU law can be conceptualized as
reliance on the EU regulatory framework as a frame of reference during
decision making. The availability of EU law as legal options depends on the
multilevel legal context in which implementers operate. When EU and
national laws are detailed and in line with each other, implementers will
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draw on the domestic regulatory framework established by the domestic prin-
cipal to which they are directly accountable.
However, in at least three contexts EU law might play a role for street-level
implementers. Firstly, EU lawcandemandmargins of discretionbeyondnational
law. Secondly, national law can provide frameworks that stand plainly in tension
with EU law. Finally, when EU legislation is superficially incorporated, the
national regulatory frameworks can be less explicit than EU rules. In these situ-
ations, implementers are confronted with ambiguity which theymay resolve by
relying on domestic regulations, EU law or by combining the frameworks.
In order to develop expectations about the use of EU law, a useful starting
point is the social psychology literature (Tyler 2006). Combining the perspec-
tives of this literature with insights of the street-level literature allows to group
implementation motivations into instrumental and normative implemen-
tation motivations.
Instrumental motivations, to begin with, refer to the desire to avoid punish-
ment and to evade risks (Winter and May 2001). In the street-level bureauc-
racy literature such motivations are prominently assumed by Lipsky (1980).
He has argued that implementers are primarily driven by the desire to cope
with limited resources, leading to routines, rationing services and other
coping strategies. Thus, implementers focus on measurable indicators with
low risks to be questioned by the outside world (ibid., Hood 2011). Risks
refer to punishments by political principals and courts, or personal conse-
quences such as reputation loss and extra workload.
Applying this instrumental perspective to the multilevel legal context, one
can assume that implementers are accountable to national principals.
National principals will prefer implementers to rely closely on national goals
(Huber and Shipan 2002). Judicial, legislative and executive checks will discou-
rage implementers to bypass national law. Since there might be monetary and
political costs if EU law is applied inconsistently, implementers will perceive it
to be risky to stretch their competences by interpreting EU law. Moreover,
mastering EU law constitutes extra work. Thus, implementers will continue
to rely on national law and leave it to courts to challenge the national level
for potentially non-compliant transposition.
This effect will be strengthened by the fact that there is no EU principal
who directly scrutinizes street-level behaviour. Hence, there are no direct
risks for implementers of being punished by EU principals for not relying on
EU law. In sum, the instrumental perspective suggests that street-level imple-
menters will consider it to be the safest choice to rely on national law, leading
to the first expectation:
Expectation 1: Street-level implementers who are motivated by instrumen-
tal considerations do not use EU law to resolve ambiguities of the multi-
level legal context.
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In addition to instrumental motivations, research has shown that normative
motivations play a crucial role in how people respond to the law (May 2005;
Tyler 2006).
From a procedural normative perspective, individuals are loyal to the legal
sources they consider legitimate (Tyler 2006). Loyalty as the primary bureau-
cratic motivation is seated deeply in Weberian views on bureaucracy. In street-
level studies, loyalty is highlighted as a professional imperative according to
which implementers see themselves as dutiful servants of the legitimated
authority (Brodkin 1997).
Under multilevel legal ambiguity, implementers evaluate which legal
source is most legitimate. If loyalties rest on the national level, implementers
will continue to rely on domestic regulatory frameworks (see Mastenbroek
2017). Yet, implementers might have internalized that EU law is superior to
national law and consider it as the legitimate legal source above national
law. If implementers develop feelings of loyalty towards EU law, they rely
on EU law, even if there are no direct benefits in taking it into account.
Higher administrators seem to develop only weak EU loyalties, even if they
have direct contact with EU institutions (Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Masten-
broek 2017). At the street level, the distance to EU institutions and national
policy making is wide. Thus, street-level implementers might have weaker
attachments to national loyalties in the first place, leading to the second
expectation:
Expectation 2: Street-level implementers who are motivated by a sense of
EU loyalty use EU law to resolve ambiguities of the multi-level legal context.
Finally, substantive normative motivations,which Tyler (2006) labelsmorality
considerations, are found to be an important motivation for obeying laws. At
the street-level, Hertogh (2009) has observed that regardless of whether or
not it is the law, implementers are often committed to certain norms owing
to personal feelings of justice (see also Tummers 2011). The close contact
to real cases, make empathy and justice evaluations particularly likely to mate-
rialize (May 2005; Winter and May 2001). This can trigger street-level imple-
menters to rely on moral judgments to make up for alleged limitations of
national policies (Keiser and Soss 1998), using formal laws only as formal jus-
tification (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003).
Arguably, EU law offers implementers a new tool box to pick and choose
within the web of national, local and EU laws those arguments that correspond
best to their feeling of justice. More concretely, in case national law suggests a
negative decision on a case, but an implementer has strong feelings of justice
that point at a positive outcome, liberal EU law might provide for new legal
arguments which the implementer can use to circumvent restrictive national
laws. Vice versa, the domestic regulatory framework will be used if it fits imple-
menters’ justice evaluations. Thus, the following can be expected:
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Expectation 3: Street-level implementers who are motivated by strong per-
sonal perceptions of justice pick and choose between national and EU law
to resolve ambiguities of the multi-level legal context.
Method and data
A theory-driven explorative approach is adopted to investigate the expec-
tations. This allows plausible connections of mechanisms that have previously
not been explored or understood (Reiter 2013: 7). For explorative research,
case selection should focus on cases for which the expected causal mechan-
ism is likely to be most evident (ibid.).
Three scope conditions are necessary for the established expectations to
apply. First, the policy field needs to have a multilevel legal character and
frontline implementers are confronted with ambiguous domestic and EU
regulatory frameworks. Second, street-level implementers have to have
some discretion. Otherwise, instrumental motivations may dominate decision
making. Finally, for normative motivations to play a role, the field needs to be
normatively laden to challenge loyalties and to trigger feelings of justice.
Migration law fulfils these scope conditions particularly well and can be
considered as a crucial case (Eckstein 1975). First, migration law is conducted
at a multitude of levels, including the international, the European, the
national, the regional and the local (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006). As a relatively
young field of EU harmonization, it is highly dynamic and national implemen-
ters are constantly confronted with new multilevel legal frameworks and rea-
lities (Zaun 2016). Tension between the different levels are common because
member states are reluctant to transpose liberal EU migration laws into their
more restrictive national laws (Bonjour and Vink 2013). Additionally, many EU
migration laws and the ensuing interpretations by the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) established fuzzy legal concepts that are directly
applicable for lower-level implementers.
Second, the policy field provides for considerable street-level discretion
because it is very client intensive (Ellermann 2006; Eule 2014). Despite conver-
gence of migration laws across the EU, decision-making in migration agencies
has been highlighted as very diverse (Jordan et al. 2003). While migration laws
appear to be clear on paper, they often lead to variation in practice, when
implementers decide on individual migrants (ibid.).
Finally, the field is salient and normatively laden. Conflicting norms related
to human rights, public welfare and security often clash with each other, and
have to be resolved during implementation (Düvell and Jordan 2003; Eule
2014).
Overall, tension between national and EU migration regulations, wide dis-
cretion and the normatively laden context offer potential for competing
street-level motivations. Thus, if we do not find street-level implementers
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who use EU law in this policy field, it is unlikely that implementers in more
technical fields use EU law.
The expectations are investigated among German street-level implemen-
ters of the Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). This administrative
context constitutes again a crucial case. Germanyhas a decentralizedmigration
implementation system and NRW established a particularly decentralized
structure. Street-level implementation is organized and conducted in foreign
registration offices (Ausländerbehörden) at county and city level. The federal
level is the main legislator, and is responsible for transposition of EU norms.
The Länder issue decrees that detail the federal law. There is no direct national
oversight over theAusländerbehörden, andonly indirect oversight from five dis-
trict governments. Thus, there is considerable street-level discretion.
Additionally, while there is a trend towards more e-service provision in
many traditional street-level bureaucracies (Bovens and Zouridis 2002), the
implementers in this study are typical street-level implementers. They have
face-to-face contact with their clients and rely little on computer-assisted
case assessment. Overall, the large margins of discretion and the personal
contact provide particularly good conditions for normative motivations.
Important to note is that focusing on a single policy sector within a single
member state limits the generalizability of the motivations found in this study.
Motivations can derive from a variety of sources, such as national culture,
organizational context and policy area (Jordan et al. 2003). However, the
purpose of this study is to investigate how different motivations relate to
the use of EU law. Thus, adding cross-country or sectoral variation would
pose the danger of influencing both motivations and the use of EU law.
This would make it difficult to disentangle the effects.
A qualitative data collection strategy was adopted. Qualitative methods
allow uncovering the mechanisms behind decision-making and contributing
to theory refinement (George and Bennett 2006). In-depth interviews with 21
implementers in 10 Ausländerbehörden were conducted in spring 2015. At
each location a senior implementer (department leader) and in most locations
one or two regular decision-makers were interviewed (see the Online Appen-
dix). Interviews lasted 40–160 minutes; records were transcribed into English.
Half the interviews were conducted individually, the other half in pairs or
groups of three, permitting respondents to be interviewed in their daily
working environment and to test whether responses differed when being
observed by colleagues.
The interviews were semi-structured and left room for examples of difficult
cases and personal evaluations of the respondents. This contributed to an in-
depth image of the complex interplay between motivations, decision-making
and the use of EU law. In order to measure the dependent variable – use of EU
law – respondents were asked how they go about decision-making in three
multilevel legal scenarios. The scenarios were tackled in open-ended
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questions in which the researcher sketched typical decision-making contexts
(Table 1). Respondents were asked to specify their decision-making practices
and detail their room for manoeuvre. Probing was used to investigate which
legal tools respondents would use to take decisions and to what extent EU law
would be used.
The first scenario concerned a situation where EU and national law were in
line with each other, but EU law demands slightly more administrative discre-
tion. The second scenario constituted a case in which EU law stands in tension
with national guidelines. The third scenario captured a context of tension with
vague national guidelines. The substances of the scenarios are described
below.
Implementation motivations were investigated by encouraging respon-
dents through open-ended questions to elaborate on what drives them
when taking decisions, with what they struggle when taking decisions and
what constitutes good decision-making. Based on examples and anecdotes
told by the respondents, a list of motivational cues was established (see the
Online Appendix). Motivational cues are arguments and justifications given
explicitly or implicitly by the respondents to explain their practices. The
cues were grouped under common themes. Motivations were instrumental,
if respondents pointed at workload, risks of overstepping their competences,
the importance that decisions have standing in court, or possible punish-
ments. Risks creating precedent cases and risks to harm the national interest
and/or the interests of the national legislator were inductively classified as
intermediate motivations between instrumental and national loyalty
motivations.
Motivations were placed under EU loyalty if respondents mentioned obli-
gations and loyalty related to supremacy of EU law. Finally, motivations
were grouped under the heading of substantive normative motivations
when respondents invoked emotions or personal feelings of fairness to motiv-
ate their implementation practices. Respondents could be guided by complex
combinations of motivations.
Analysis
The case studies are structured as follows. The first part outlines the substance
of the three legal scenarios. The next part presents decision-making practices
of the respondents and their use of EU law. The last part analyses the under-
lying implementation motivations in light of the established expectations.
Multilevel legal scenarios
Table 1 summarizes the substance of the EU and national legal framework of
the three decision-making scenarios discussed with the respondents.
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Table 1. Three legal scenarios.
Legal scenario Main EU law Main national law Decision scenario
Scenario 1 Income requirement for third country family reunification visa
Discretionary EU law Member states may
demand from sponsor
of third country family
reunification a
minimum income as
guiding criterion for
granting the visa
(Family Reunification
Directive 2003/86 EC
Art 7.1.)
Guiding criterion may
not be used as hard
benchmark to limit
right of family
reunification (CJEU
ruling Chakroun)
Evaluations have to
take individual
circumstances and
needs of family into
account (CJEU ruling
Chakroun)
Foreign registration offices
required to use standard
calculation to determine
guiding benchmark
(German Residence Act.
Art. 27, Art. 5.1.1,
Administrative
Guidelines Art 2.3.4)
Administrative decisions
should be prognosis
decision, evaluating if
family can sustain itself
in the future (national
Administrative
Guidelines Art 2.3.3)
National interpretation
of Chakroun: tax free
amounts may no longer
be used to the
disadvantage of the
applicants (BVerwG 1 C
20.09 and 1 C 21.09)
How does the case
worker decide on the
visa when the income
of the sponsor
remains 5-10 euro
below the calculated
monthly national
benchmarks?
Scenario 2 Language requirement for Turkish citizens for family reunification visa
Tension between EU
and national law
with explicit
instructions
Member states may
require third country
nationals to comply
with integration
measures (Family
Reunification Directive
Art 6.2)
German language
requirements not
compliant with the
standstill clause of
Turkey Association
Agreement (CJEU
ruling Dogan)
Language certificate is
required for all visa for
family reunification
including Turkish citizens
(Art 30. 1AufthG)
National interpretation
of Dogan:
Implementation
instruction from the
Ministry of External
Affairs: Implementers
should not change their
practices regarding
Turkish citizens. Existing
exceptions based on
hardship cases are
stressed.
How does the case
work decide on the
visa when the spouse
of a Turkish citizen
does not provide for
the German language
requirement?
Scenario 3 Application of administrative fees for Turkish citizens and examples of
transposition gaps
Tension between EU
and national law
with inexplicit
national
regulatory
framework
a) Administrative fees for
residence permits for
Turkish citizens have to
be in line with Turkey
Association Agreement
(see CJEU case Sahin)
a) Several years national
legislators declared
Sahin ruling not
applicable to Germany.
National ruling (BVerwG
1 C 12.12) eventually
confirmed Sahin but it
a) How did the office
handle the
intermediate period
between a national
solution and the EU
obligations?
(Continued )
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The first scenario was taken from the field of family migration and related
to the evaluation of the income requirement for visas for third country family
reunification. The Ausländerbehörden decide on the visa together with the dip-
lomatic missions abroad. One condition for the visa is a sufficient income of
the sponsor. Both EU and national law demand an individual evaluation of
the income condition. Yet EU law demands a slightly more discretionary
approach to this condition than national law, by emphasizing an evaluation
of the needs of each individual applicant (see CJEU ruling in Chakroun).
Respondents were asked if, and under which conditions, they would agree
to a visa application if applicants earn less than required by the national
benchmarks.
The second scenario was also taken from the field of family migration and
concerns the so-called language requirement for the visa of family reunifica-
tion. The CJEU in Dogan has explicitly challenged the German obligations in
light of the Turkey Association Agreement, suggesting that language require-
ments for Turkish citizens are not in line with EU law. However, the national
legislator explicitly instructed its administrations not to change their practices.
Respondents were asked if they would agree to a visa application of a Turkish
applicant, provided the spouse had no language certificate.
For the third scenario, several situations were discussed. For example,
several court rulings found that the administrative fees demanded for
Turkish residence permits are too high under the Turkey Association Agree-
ment. However, it took the legislator a considerable period of time to
provide instructions of how to handle the fees. Here, the leaderships of the
foreign registration offices were asked how they handled the intermediate
period. In order to explore practices beyond the office leaders, respondents
were asked to elaborate on their practices in the case that EU directives
and CJEU rulings are not transposed into national law.
The three scenarios constitute everyday decision-making in a foreign regis-
tration office. The focus on family migration law was based on the fact that
family migration constitutes a crucial source of migration and EU family
migration law is relatively developed (Bonjour and Vink 2013). Moreover,
the three scenarios do not directly touch upon aspects related to the
current refugee crisis.
Table 1. Continued.
Legal scenario Main EU law Main national law Decision scenario
took time until legislator
formally clarified
appropriate fees
b) late transposition and
implicit EU principles in
transposition laws
b) How does the case
worker handle
situations in which EU
directives and rulings
are not fully
transposed?
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Scenario one: use of discretionary EU law
Starting with practices regarding the income requirement, all respondents
stressed that they take the individual circumstances of applicants into
account. However, respondents differed widely in interpreting their room for
manoeuvre. At least seven respondents approached the criteria from a rela-
tively discretionary perspective, while 10 took more restrictive approaches.
Respondents with discretionary approaches indicated that a discrepancy of
around 5–8 euros per month below the national income benchmark constituts
no problem. If they believed applicants can otherwise sustain themselves, they
would still approve the visa application. With a positive prognosis, three respon-
dents would even accept applicants up to 50–100 euros or 10 per cent below
the calculated requirement. As one respondent commented:
These margins are not explicitly codified … If there are 50 euros missing, we
would decide that we take the risk that this family will not draw on social
benefits for these 50 euros. We internally decided that you cannot take these
requirements as hard benchmarks where one cent or euro less leads automati-
cally to a rejection. (Resp._B1)
The more restrictive respondents would normally not agree to a visa if the
sponsor’s income was below the calculated benchmark. As one respondent
explained:
When someone has 10 euro less, we no longer have the option to decide posi-
tively. … We strictly rely on the legal demands. I cannot paint a nice picture if
the requirements are not fulfilled. (Resp._I1)
Coming to the use of EU law, it became clear that even though respondents
differed considerably in how lenient they were with the income requirement,
discretion was not informed by EU law but by federal court rulings. Even if
respondents argued closely in line with the Chakroun ruling (Resp._B1), the
ruling was mostly not explicitly mentioned.
Two respondents mentioned national rulings that referred to Chakroun,
but they considered Chakroun as a restriction to their scope of action that
no longer allowed them to include tax-free amounts in the income bench-
mark. One respondent claimed that this liberalization would trigger him to
consider the calculated benchmark now more restrictively (Resp._E1). Only
one respondent referred explicitly to Chakroun. However, even he did not
use the ruling to extent his room for manoeuvre beyond national law (Resp.-
_C1). Overall, EU law was not used explicitly in case of discretionary EU law.
Scenario two: use of EU law under tension with explicit national
instructions
Practices regarding the language requirements differed only slightly among
respondents. Whereas some argued that the embassies are responsible for
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the language requirement, other respondents saw their role in checking this
condition more actively. Overall, respondents referred more often to EU law
than in the previous scenario. The Dogan ruling was mentioned by most
respondents. However, eventually all but one respondent gave priority to
the national interpretation of the judgment. Some respondents pointed to
the wording of the CJEU ruling to justify the national interpretation (Resp._F1,
I1). Other respondents agreed that there is a conflict between the legal levels,
but as one respondent explained:
If the national legislator eventually issues instructions for us, I try to orientate
myself on that and not explicitly contradict the national interpretation.
(Resp._J1)
Thus, while some respondents questioned the national interpretations in light
of EU law (Resp._A1), they still pointed at the national regulatory framework as
the ultimate decision tool. Only one respondent did not mention the national
interpretations and only referred to the CJEU ruling (Resp._C1). Overall, under
legal conﬂict between EU law and explicit national regulatory frameworks,
respondents were surprisingly aware of EU law, but eventually they relied
on the national regulatory framework or pointed to the diplomatic missions
as ultimate decision-makers.
Scenario three: use of EU law with inexplicit national regulatory
framework
Concerning situations in which national regulatory frameworks remain inex-
plicit, respondents indicated highly diverse practices. Regarding the fees for
Turkish applicants, the leadership of some of the foreign registration offices
decided to waive the fees before there were explicit national instructions
(Location_C). Other office leaders decided to keep demanding the fees await-
ing an official adjustment of national regulations (Location_I, E). More gener-
ally, when EU legislation or CJEU rulings are not explicitly transposed, six
respondents indicated that for them EU law is not relevant. As these respon-
dents put it, ‘we are mainly implementers of national law’ (Resp._A2) or ‘CJEU
rulings confront us sometimes with the situation that national law is no longer
applicable, but for us legally binding are of course only the national laws’
(Resp._D1).
However, in situations in which national regulations are missing or not
clear, the majority of respondents described that they would use EU law
next to national law. As one respondent explained:
The EU has established some general legal principles which somehow are
implied in our national law, but you cannot read them anywhere. In these
cases we more or less use our discretion to read the national law in light of
the principles which derive out of EU law or CJEU rulings. (Resp._F1)
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Two respondents even pointed out how they themselves or their colleagues
sometimes use EU directives which are not yet transposed (Resp._J1;
Resp._A1). As Respondent A1 claimed:
The problem in Germany is that almost all EU requirements are transposed in the
last minute or even with delay. I feel this is a mentality issue of the German legis-
lator, to hope that nobody will notice. So, if a new ruling or directive emerges, we
try to take this into account even it is not yet part of the German law or admin-
istrative guidelines. Even if the EU law conflicts with the national law we take the
EU rules into account.
In sum, when national law does not explicitly deﬁne implementation guide-
lines, implementers were surprisingly open to EU law as an additional
source of decision-making. Table 2 summarizes the use of EU law across the
scenarios.
Implementation motivations and the use of EU law
In the following, the established expectations are explored. Starting with
instrumental motivations, the interviews showed that the most important gui-
dance for respondents was that their decisions have standing in front of
national courts. Regarding the income requirement, several respondents
argued that national courts demand a restrictive approach. Therefore, they
could not apply the condition in a discretionary way (Resp._D1). Additionally,
several respondents argued that they are afraid that it would backfire on
them, and that social welfare offices would ask them critical questions if appli-
cants eventually relied on social welfare (Resp._F1; Resp._F2; Resp._E1; Resp._
J2). In line with the expectation, these respondents did not see it as an option
to extend their room for manoeuvre by using EU law.
Instrumental motivations were articulated even more explicitly when
respondents reflected on their practices for the second scenario. Many
respondents argued that they consider it risky to apply original EU jurispru-
dence when the national legislator provided explicit instructions. For
example, six respondents highlighted that interpreting EU law goes beyond
Table 2. Use of EU law across scenarios.
Legal context Legal scenario Use of EU law
Discretionary EU law Income criterion for third
country family reunification
Little use
Tension between EU and
national law with explicit
national instructions
Language requirement for
Turkish family reunification
Active reference but eventual
reliance on national instructions
Tension between EU and
national law with inexplicit
national regulatory framework
Administrative fees for
Turkish citizens and gaps in
transposition law
Some very actively use EU law by
correcting problematic
transposition, most respondents
combine national and EU
instructions
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their competences as implementers (Resp._I1; Resp._I2; Resp._J1; Resp._J2;
Resp._H1; Resp._H2). Overall, risk, staying within the assigned competences
and securing standing in front of the court were considerations which trig-
gered reluctant approaches towards EU law and were dominant among
leading and regular decision-makers.
However, contrary to the first expectation, instrumental motivations were
also articulated by respondents in leadership positions who used EU law in
the third scenario. As one respondent argued:
In terms of the direct results it can be a safe choice for us to follow the (national
and local) rules. However, it does not always go well in the long run. Sometimes
it leads eventually to a change in the rules if there are too many (EU) rulings. That
leaves us with a mess if we took a lot of decisions based on old rules … We are
always in between and eventually we have to take responsibilities for messy
decisions which we did not cause. … So we evaluate the consequences of
the different legal options and then decide. (Resp._C1)
Hence, in contrast to expectation one, in the face of tension between the differ-
ent levels of law, combined with unclear domestic guidelines, leading imple-
menters consider it to be risky not to rely on EU law. Following the
respondents, national courts might eventually rely on EU law even if the national
legislator did not adjust the law. Therefore, inconsistent decision-making can
harm the reputation of the Ausländerbehörde and it constitutes extra workload
when decisions need to be corrected. Consequently, the ﬁrst expectation that
instrumental implementation motivations trigger inactive use of EU law only
holds in the context of explicit national guidelines. Without clear national guide-
lines, instrumental motivations exist that can trigger use of EU law.
Coming to normative motivations, the analysis showed that both pro-
cedural and substantive norms played a role for respondents. Around half
the respondents pointed towards their professional norms as implementers.
Often, these norms were connected to instrumental motivations. For
example, respondents pointed at their responsibilities as a good implementer
to balance the interests of national society and tax payers, to stay within
national legal bounds and their assigned national duty (Resp._A1; Resp._B1;
Resp._C2; Resp._D1; Resp._F1; Resp._H1). Professional norms were mainly
related to national loyalties. Loyalty towards EU law was articulated to a
much lesser extent. If it was articulated, it was mentioned implicitly and in
combination with other obligations. As one respondent argued:
It is in many ways a balancing act because particularly our local government
always says we should only do what is written in the (national) law … but
we observe all the new developments, we also get the relevant journals that
include EU judgments. On the working floor, we are confronted with these
new developments and we want to take them on board. Yet, when we meet
with politicians, they always ask in which national laws we find these things.
(Resp._H2)
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This respondent ﬁnds it challenging not to do justice to EU law and general
new rulings, but he also receives steering signals from local policy-makers
not to rely on the new developments. Eventually, this motivates reluctant
uses of EU law. Similarly, another respondent argued:
Of course we are aware that EU law comes before national law and national law
is superior to Länder law … But I think I would get a punishment if I would start
transposing EU law myself … For such activities my competences are clearly
too limited … However, if CJEU judgments with direct effect challenge national
law, than I take it into account and we define a common practice for our office,
similar as with the Turkey cases. (Resp._I1)
Overall, EU loyalties are subordinated to instrumental motivations and pro-
fessional norms of not overstepping one’s competences. Thus, expectation
two receives no support: because EU loyalties were generally weak.
The last expectation held that personal justice evaluations trigger imple-
menters to pick and choose between national and EU norms. Almost all
respondents mentioned their struggle between emotions, morality and
legal demands. However, respondents differed on the emphasis they put
on such personal considerations. Some implementers explained that they
are not first of all implementers of the law, but rather ‘client advisors’
(Resp._A1). In light of the income requirement these respondents explained
how they try to help clients to meet the critical benchmarks (Resp._F2;
Resp._G1; Resp._G2; Resp._I2; Resp._J1). Several implementers called this ‘an
informal practice’, because national law does not oblige them to advice
clients (Resp._A1). These, respondents relied creatively on different levels of
law, but rarely used the EU jurisprudence to justify discretion.
The expectation that substantive morality norms trigger use of EU law is
most clearly met in the case of legal conflict and ambiguity of national law.
For example, one respondent pointed out that he encourages his colleagues to:
use the law in line with the principle of the IKEA slogan: ‘discover the possibili-
ties’. You always have to stay within the law but if the law offers you possibilities
no one should hinder us to use them … European law provides us especially
regarding Turkish citizens more possibilities than the German law and it is inter-
esting for us to discover these new opportunities within the law. (Resp._B1)
This respondent referred to EU law as a source that offers new opportunities
to become creative. While he stressed that this is only possible within the
limits of national law, another respondent explicitly argued that he would
even interpret EU law on his own when the national level failed to do so
because ‘in this way we maybe harm the German state, but at least we do
not harm the individual migrant’ (Resp._A1).
Overall, few respondents would rely on EU law at the expense of national law
this openly. Risk and national loyalty motivations trigger mostly reluctant
approaches towards EU law. Respondents are particularly afraid to be
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responsible for precedent cases. However, if national law fails to provide clear
guidelines, most implementers use EU law parallel to national law. In line
with the expectations, a group of respondents uses EU law to bring the law
closer to their personal justice evaluations. Contrary to expectation, one also
instrumental motivations can trigger use of EU law.
Conclusion
This contribution explored the extent to which street-level implementers use
EU law and what motivates them when doing so. Three decision contexts in
which EU law might play a role were identified. The scenarios differed in the
level of legal ambiguity between national and EU regulatory frameworks.
In order to analyse the use of EU law, the study adopted a bottom–up
approach (Thomann and Sager 2017a). By relying on the insights of social psy-
chology (Tyler 2006) and the behavioural street-level bureaucracy literature
(Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2012), two perspectives on
implementation motivations were identified. First, from an instrumental per-
spective, one could expect that there are few incentives for street-level imple-
menters to use EU law. Second, procedural and substantive normative
motivations were expected to trigger use of EU law. The study explored the
expectations empirically in the context of EU migration law implementation
in Germany.
Four main insights can be drawn from this analysis. First, the study demon-
strated that EU implementation at the micro-level fruitfully complements the
rational and constructivist institutional actor logics (March and Olsen 1998)
that have been used to explain EU implementation at the member state level.
Second, in line with the street-level literature (Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody
and Musheno 2012) and studies on migration management (Ellermann 2006;
Eule 2014; Jordan et al. 2003), the implementers investigated in this study
were creative and flexible in their use of legal tools. While the limited literature
on practical EU implementation has treated administrations as yet another
source for non-compliance (Versluis 2007) or ignored the street-level of EU
implementation (Treib 2014), this study has shown that lower level implemen-
ters are surprisingly aware of the multilevel legal context in which they
operate. Most implementers eventually give priority to national guidance in
their decisions (see also Mastenbroek 2017). However, a considerable group
of implementers sometimes uses EU law, particularly when the national
level provides superficial guidelines. Some implementers even correct for
missing EU transposition. Consequently, the study highlighted the importance
of adding bottom–up approaches towards EU compliance.
Third, the study showed that implementers draw on EU law for varying pur-
poses, leading to variation in implementation practices. This suggests that
Europeanization does not necessarily harmonize domestic decision-making.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 1343
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
7:0
7 1
7 A
ug
ust
 20
17
 
Often, active approaches towards EU law are contingent on normative
implementation motivations. This is in line with the theoretical expectations.
However, contrary to the established expectations, loyalty towards EU law has
its limits in promoting uses of EU law. Instead, use of EU law can be motivated
by substantive morality norms. In light of Egeberg and Trondal’s (2009)
‘double-hatted’ agents who promote the interests of their national and Euro-
pean master owing to loyalty to the two masters, ‘double-hatted’ street-level
implementers sometime use the different levels of law to bring about policy
outcomes they personally consider as just.
Finally, this study showed that instrumental motivations trigger mostly no
use of EU law. Particularly when national regulatory frameworks are explicit,
implementers consider it risky to draw on EU law and focus, in line with
Lipsky’s (1980) expectations, on decision-making with low risks of being ques-
tioned by the outside world. However, in case of conflict between national
and EU norms, combined with lacking national guidance, some implementers
considered it risky not to rely on EU law. This indicates that even though there
are no direct personal consequences for implementers, there are implicit
instrumental motivations for relying on EU law.
Importantly, this study was limited to a very specific administrative context,
namely the highly decentralized German administrative setting of North
Rhine-Westphalia. As a result, motivational patterns observed in this study
might be specific to several scope conditions, such as the presence of a multi-
level legal context with ambiguity between national and EU obligations, the
high level of discretion in the German administrative setting and the norma-
tively laden policy field that requires considerable client interactions at the
frontline. Yet, from the street-level bureaucracy literature, we can expect
that other client-intensive and normatively laden fields comparable to
migration, such as social policies, might reveal similar motivational mechan-
isms as found in this study (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2012). The study
might be less representative for more technical fields of EU law which may
trigger less normative motivations. Nevertheless, as this study has shown,
even instrumental motivations can trigger use of EU law, which suggests
that street-level use of EU law might not be limited to normatively laden
policy fields.
Follow-up studies should add external validity by bringing in a cross-country
or cross-sectoral comparative perspective (Thomann and Sager 2017b). That is
to say, what role does EU law play for implementers who operate under less dis-
cretion? Additionally, this study with its explorative elements calls for a more
generalizable explanatory test of the relationship between motivations and
use of EU law. For example, a quantitative survey among implementers
across policy sectors that differ in normative sensitivity could provide such a
test to further enhance our understating of the role of motivations for EU
implementation.
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